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Learning in a local interaction hawk-dove game
Do not learn as your neighbours do
Jurjen Kamphorst1 and Gerard van der Laan2
Abstract
We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they
can either imitate the most succesful player in the neighborhood or play a best
reply versus the opponent’s previous action. From simulations it appears that
each learning strategy will be used, because each performs better when it is
less popular. Despite that, clustering may occur if players choose their learning
strategy on the basis of largely similar information. Finally, on average players
will play Hawk with a probability larger than in the mixed Nash equilibrium of
the stage game.
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1 Introduction
In the economic literature agents are typically rational. To be specific, they are
fully aware of the options (formally, the strategies3) available to them, as well
as of their own preference ordering over the possible outcomes. In addition they
are capable of making costlessly and flawlessly any computations necessary to
determine their optimal strategy. Moreover, it is typically assumed that the ra-
tionality of agents is common knowledge, that the agents have full information
on the strategies available to other agents, as well as some idea on the pref-
erences of the other agents over the different possible outcomes. Under these
assumptions economists have been able to study many economic phenomena and
to derive many interesting and insightful conclusions. However, often agents do
not use all the information available to them, do not make all necessary com-
putations and/or do not trust that other agents act rationally. Nevertheless,
it is not a priori clear whether irrationality in the decision making of real-life
agents leads to qualitatively different outcomes. Agents may still behave as if
these typical assumptions are satisfied. They may have learned in some way
which action is optimal, for instance from their own experience in similar situ-
ations in the past or the experience of other agents, or they may act as rational
by imitating others who apparently followed a good strategy themselves. Of
course, it also may happen that agents never learn the optimal decisions. What
agents will learn, given the way in which they learn, is studied in the field of
evolutionary game theory.
Since the 1960s biologists have applied game theory in evolutionary biol-
ogy. Evolutionary game theory as such was developed by biologists in the early
1970s, see e.g. Maynard Smith and Price (1973) and Maynard Smith (1982).
In this literature agents start with a predetermined strategy (where different
agents may have different strategies) and the rewards are measured in terms of
Darwinian fitness instead of utility, that is, the payoffs of a player determine how
much offspring he has (all with the same strategy as their parent). This gives
rise to population dynamics and the criterion of rational behavior by agents was
replaced by (stability conditions on) these population dynamics to generate the
solutions. Such dynamics are commonly named replicator dynamics.
Economists have picked up these developments by recognizing that these
models can also be used to study the effects of a learning process of agents
by allowing players to occasionally choose another strategy, see e.g. Samuel-
son (1997), Vega-Redondo (1996), Weibull (1995), Young (1998) for textbooks
on Evolutionary Game Theory. Where biologists assume that agents with a
better strategy have on average more offspring, economists assume that agents
are more likely to adopt a strategy that they perceive as more successful than
one that is less successful. Since payoff is measured in offspring, the dynamics
in biology are clear. There is an important strand in the economic evolution-
ary game theoretic literature which adopts the replicator dynamics. It assumes
3 An action (decision) is a behaviour performed in a particular situation. A strategy is a
specification of which action an agent will choose (or with what probability which action will
be chosen) in any situation in which the player may find itself.
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that the share of the population using each strategy grows at a rate propor-
tional to how well the agents using that strategy are doing relative to the whole
population (see for example Fudenberg and Levine (1998)). However, learning
in economics, meaning that there is some learning rule (also: update rule) by
which agents convert information from the past into current strategies, is more
complicated. Learning rules exist in a huge variety, including best response to
previous strategies of other players (e.g. Anderlini and Ianni (1996), Goyal and
Janssen (1997) and Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993))), imitation of successful
strategies or agents (e.g. Janssen (2000), Kirchkamp (2000), Noailly, Van den
Bergh and Withagen (2004) and Possajennikov (2000)), or rules based on reci-
procity like tit-for-tat or ’Win Cooperate, Lose Defect’ (e.g. Tieman, Houba
and Van der Laan (2000)). Unfortunately, although we can ignore many ’un-
reasonable’ learning rules (such as ’use the strategy that performs worst’), the
remaining learning rules can lead to different results, see e.g Eshel, Samuelson
and Shaked (1998). Hence it is important to know which learning rules are most
applicable under what circumstances, and, if we can expect that some players
use a different learning rule than others, how these learning rules interact.
In this paper we address these issues by letting players choose between two
learning rules, and allowing them to change their choice every once in a while,
according to some long run rule. This is similar to regarding the capacity choice
of firms which is fixed in the short run, but variable in the long run. A learning
rule is thus interpreted as a long term strategic variable. The main aim of
the paper is to study the consequences of having multiple learning rules in the
population. Moreover, we investigate whether one learning rule will drive out
the other learning rule, so whether it is likely that all players will learn the
same way. Since many papers have shown the significance of the interaction
structure, see e.g. Ellison (1993) and Goyal (1996), we study these questions
with two different interaction structures. Our focus is on a local interaction
structure, where players are distributed on a torus. In this set-up, two players
are matched with positive probability to play the stage game if and only if they
are neighbors. By also considering a model with global interaction (any pair of
players can be matched with positive probability) we gain insight into the effects
of the interaction structure on the choice of players between the two learning
rules. The stage game is the Hawk-Dove game. When two players are called to
play the stage game, each can choose one of the two actions Hawk and Dove.
When both play ‘Dove’ both get the so-called selection benefit payoff, when one
player plays ‘Dove’ and the other ‘Hawk’, the ‘Dove’ player gets a coordination
benefit payoff and other receives both benefits, when both play ‘Hawk’, both
get nothing.
Recent similar approaches can be found in Kirchkamp (1999), Josephson
(2001) and Droste, Hommes and Tuinstra (2002). Kirchkamp (1999) looks at
a local interaction model where players cannot reselect their action every time
they play. When a player chooses his action, he compares the performance of
his own action with that of a randomly selected neighbor. His strategy specifies
the general willingness to switch to the neighbor’s rule as well as the weights
attached to the information on the own rule and on that of the neighbor. Joseph-
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Figure 1: Terminology in this paper
son (2001) looks at which rules out of a class of learning rules are evolutionarily
stable in a setting with uniform interaction. In a uniform interaction model
Droste et al. (2002) look at a Cournot stage game on which the best-reply
dynamics are unstable and where some rules may be more costly to use than
other rules.
In Section 2 we describe the framing of the learning situation. Section 3
presents the analysis and the results. We find that this stage game provides
much insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the learning rules, as well as
into the interaction between these rules. Section 4 concludes.
2 The learning situation
In this paper we consider a multiperiod model in which in any period two players
from a population of players are selected to play the stage game. In a typical
model the learning rule of a player prescibes which strategy he has to play in
the stage game. In this paper we consider a situation in which there are two
learning rules within the population. Occasionally a player can switch from one
learning rule to the other. This decision is based on a long run learning rule.
In this way the long rule learning rule determines the strategic learning rule
and the strategic learning rule determines which strategy (action) a player has
to play in the stage game. To avoid confusion, in the remaining we use the
following terminology. The stage game strategy of a player is called an action.
The learning rule that determines which action a player has to play in the stage
game is called the strategy of a player in the population game, being the game
in which the sequence of stage games is played. The long run learning rule that
determines which strategy a player plays in the population game is called the
long run rule (see Figure 1).
The population in our game with local interaction contain n × n players
spread over a torus consisting of n× n cells. In Figure 2 we show a 4× 4 torus.
In each cell there is exactly one player. Every player has a neighborhood of the
surrounding 8 players and himself. A torus has no borders, which means that a
player on row (column) n has also surrounding players on row (column) 1. For
instance, the neighborhood of player X in the top right cell consists of the nine
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Figure 2: A 4×4 torus
grey cells. Players observe only their own neighborhood, and whenever they
are selected to play, they play against one of their neighbors. In the game with
global interaction the neighborhood of a player consists of all other players (on
the torus) in the population.
In the population game a sequence of stage games is played. The stage game
is a 2-player normal form game in which both players play an action from the
action space A = {Dove, Hawk}. The payoff matrix of a player is given by
AHD =
[
α ε
α+ ε 0
]
, (1)
where α > ε > 0, where the top row (left column) corresponds to the action
’Dove’ and the bottom row (right column) to the action ’Hawk’. The player
itself chooses a row and his opponent a column. We denote the payoff of a
player who plays s ∈ A against some opponent playing s′ by π(s, s′). Since
α > ε > 0 the stage game has two asymmetric equilibria (in pure actions),
namely (Dove,Hawk) and (Hawk,Dove). In a Nash equilibrium, so if players
manage to coordinate to play different actions, both players get the payoff ε. In
addition the player choosing ‘Hawk’ in a Nash equilibrium gets the additional
payoff α. We call ε the coordination benefit and α the selection benefit, as it
is the benefit that a player receives if he would be allowed to select the most
preferred action in the Nash equilibrium. When both players play ‘Dove’ both
receive the selection benefit, when both play ‘Hawk’, both receive zero payoff.
In the population game the stage game is played for a number of periods. In
each period any player is assumed to know from all players in his neighborhood
the chosen actions and the obtained payoffs in the last stage game they played.
In every period one randomly selected pair of neighbors plays the Hawk-Dove
stage game. Each player in the selected pair of neighbors chooses a stage game
action according to his population game strategy. In the population game each
player plays a strategy from the strategy space S = {BR, IBA}. A player that
uses the BR (IBA) strategy is called a BR (IBA) player.
A BR player plays in each stage game a (myopic) best reply versus his
opponent. This means that he plays a best reply against the last chosen action
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by his opponent. So, a BR player acts as if he regards this last chosen action as
the best forecast of his opponent’s action in the current period. Note that this
particular variant of a best reply strategy is consistent with short memory (only
the last played action of the players are known) and knowledge of the identity
of the opponent. In other variants of best reply strategies players may expect a
mixed action instead of a pure action, for instance in case of fictitious play, see
Fudenberg and Levine (1998), where players have information on the complete
history of their opponent, or adaptive play, see e.g. Young (1998), where players
have information on a random sample of their opponent’s strategy. In these
variants players are assumed to recall more off the past. In for instance Ellison
(1993)) it is assumed that players do not know the identity of their opponent
and therefore base their beliefs on the actions of more than one player.
An IBA player tries to learn from the best performing player. To do so, he
considers all the payoffs that the players in his neighboorhood obtained in the
last stage game they played and then he plays the action that was chosen by the
player with the highest payoff. This behavior is consistent with people who read
success stories and try to copy them, businesses that imitate business models of
successful firms, etc.
The strategy of a player prescribes the action that he chooses. As such it
corresponds to the learning rule in many other papers, where strategies and
actions coincide. In this paper, on top of the strategy (learning rule) there is
an exogeneously determined, long run (learning) rule. In each period, the first
selected player of the pair gets the opportunity to evaluate his strategy. The
decision to stay at the current strategy or the switch to the alternative strategy
is determined by the long run rule of the population game. In this paper we
consider two long run rules: the Best Reply Rule (BRR) or the Imitate Best
Behavior Rule (IBBR). When IBBR is applied, the players are assumed to
gather information from their neighborhoods on the average payoffs of the two
strategies BR and IBA. When a player has the opportunity to reconsider his
strategy, he adopts the strategy with the highest average payoff. If BRR is
applied, a player chooses the strategy that would have given him the highest
payoff in his last matching. So if the last time that he played, the IBA strategy
would have given him a higher payoff than the BR strategy, then he selects IBA
as his strategy, and vice versa. In both cases players stay at their old strategy
in case of a tie. We would like to emphasize that all players have the same long
run rule, and that this rule does not change during the population game. In
our analysis we mainly consider the IBBR. As a check on the robustness of our
choice of IBBR as the long run rule, we also compare some of the outcomes with
the outcomes when using BRR.
Within the population game the timing is as follows. At the start of a new
period one player is selected randomly from the population. This player gets
the opportunity to change his current strategy according to the evaluation of
his strategy by the long run rule. Then one of his neighbors (in the game with
global interaction one of the other players) is selected and the selected pair
plays the stage game. In the stage game both players choose the action (Dove
or Hawk) prescibed by their strategy. Then both players receive their payoffs
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and a new period starts.
In the analysis we mainly focus our attention to questions such as: how will
the play of the stage game evolve, and what does this depend on? Which of the
two strategies (BR and IBA) will survive under what circumstances? If both
strategies survive, what will determine the relative popularity of each strategy
(we measure this popularity as the share of BR players in the population)? If
both strategies survive, will there be large areas with only IBA or only BR
players? What is the impact of placing the population on a torus, instead of
using global interaction and which results will qualitatively change if we impose
the BRR as the long run rule instead of IBBR?
Most of the questions cannot be answered by analytical treatment of the
model. Therefore the majority of the analysis is based on simulations. Each
simulation is run for a population of 900 players, in case of local interaction
spread over a 30×30 torus. Each simulation is of a certain type, namely the pa-
rameters α and ε in payoff matrix AHD and the other settings of the model (e.g.
the initial expected share of BR players, the long run rule, etc.). All simulations
with local interaction are run 1000 times. All simulations with global interac-
tion are run a 100 times. The data reported for each simulation is the average
of all runs of the simulation. The initial situation is generated independently
for each of the runs: each player is assigned to have Dove as their (virtually)
last played action with 50 percent probability and each player is assigned the
same payoff from the (virtually) last played stage game, which is lower than
the minimal payoff of the stage game. In most simulations the probability that
a player initially is a BR player is 50 percent. In some simulations we look at
the influence of starting out with many (or few) BR players. Then either one,
respectively eight, out of nine players are BR players. Observe that the variety
in initial situations of the runs of any one simulation is very large.
3 Results and Analysis
In Table 1 (see the Appendix for the meaning of the columns in the table) we
present the simulation results for a variety of stage game payoff matrices of
the form (1). We summarize the results in Facts 7.1 to 7.10. We first present
some facts regarding the selection of actions by the different strategies. Then
we can explain the facts related to the popularity of the two strategies. From
the simulations it appears that only the relative size of α to ε is important, not
the absolute value of α. Therefore, in Table 1 only the ratio is given.
Fact 7.1 BR players play Dove roughly half of the time if players can only
use the BR strategy. If also the IBA strategy can be used, then BR players
will tend to play more Dove than Hawk.
Fact 7.2 IBA players will tend to play Hawk. The more BR neighbors an
IBA player has, the stronger this tendency is.
Fact 7.3 Under global interaction and with BR players in the population,
IBA players play Hawk with probability one.
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ID Rel. Sel. 
Ben. (α/ε) 
Descr. Share 
BR 
St. Dev. 
Share BR 
p(D) p(D|B) p(D|I) Share BR 
next to BR 
HD1 100  0.356 0.028 0.286 0.669 0.075 0.451 
HD2 60  0.356 0.028 0.288 0.671 0.075 0.451 
HD3 30  0.354 0.029 0.287 0.671 0.076 0.449 
HD4 20  0.353 0.029 0.286 0.672 0.076 0.448 
HD5 16 2/3  0.356 0.028 0.288 0.671 0.076 0.452 
HD6 15  0.355 0.028 0.286 0.669 0.074 0.450 
HD7 12 1/2  0.360 0.030 0.288 0.668 0.074 0.455 
HD8 6 1/4  0.394 0.026 0.298 0.670 0.056 0.466 
HD9 5  0.413 0.024 0.305 0.670 0.048 0.471 
HD10 1  0.541 0.020 0.354 0.636 0.022 0.564 
HD11 0.5  0.590 0.019 0.372 0.619 0.018 0.605 
HD12 0.01  0.633 0.018 0.388 0.603 0.017 0.641 
HD13 15 IBA only 0.000 0.000 0.311 n.a. 0.311 n.a. 
HD14 15 BR only 1.000 0.000 0.500 0.500 n.a. n.a. 
HD15 15 B:I = 1:8 0.356 0.029 0.287 0.670 0.075 0.450 
HD16 15 B:I = 8:1 0.356 0.028 0.285 0.669 0.074 0.451 
HD17 1 B:I = 1:8 0.541 0.020 0.354 0.635 0.023 0.564 
HD18 1 B:I = 8:1 0.540 0.021 0.353 0.635 0.022 0.563 
HD19 30 BRR 0.619 0.012 0.402 0.630 0.030 0.585 
HD20 20 BRR 0.620 0.013 0.401 0.629 0.030 0.585 
HD21 15 BRR 0.619 0.012 0.403 0.631 0.031 0.585 
HD22 0.01 BRR 0.624 0.012 0.403 0.629 0.027 0.591 
HD23 15 BRR, B:I = 1:8 0.620 0.012 0.401 0.629 0.030 0.585 
HD24 15 BRR, B:I = 8:1 0.619 0.013 0.401 0.629 0.030 0.585 
HD25 15 GI 0.122 0.046 0.108 0.897 0.000 n.a. 
HD26 5 GI 0.287 0.048 0.221 0.775 0.000 n.a. 
HD27 15 GI, BRR 0.643 0.012 0.392 0.609 0.000 n.a. 
 
Table 1: Simulation results.
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Fact 7.4 In the simulations with IBA players, the outcomes are inefficient
because too many players play Hawk. Moreover the dynamics do not con-
verge to a Nash equilibrium.
Evidence for Fact 7.1. Simulation HD14 shows that in the absence of the
IBA strategy players play Dove 50 percent of the time. However, all other
simulations in Table 1 show that when also the IBA strategy is available and
the IBA players tend to select Hawk, then the BR players favor Dove (i.e.
play Dove more than 50 percent of the time). The intuition for this result is the
following. In the Hawk-Dove game, a BR player plays the action that is opposite
to the last action that his opponent played. Hence, if the whole population uses
only the BR strategy then in the long run (i) BR players play Dove 50 percent
of the time and (ii) in every period roughly 50 percent of the population plays
Dove. However, when some players use an alternative strategy and this strategy
prescribes Dove with a probability higher than 50 percent, then BR players are
more likely to meet Dove then Hawk, and therefore they are more likely to play
Hawk. Likewise BR players tend to select Dove if the alternative strategy favors
Hawk. In our model the alternative strategy is IBA. Since IBA favors Hawk,
our simulations indeed show that the BR players play more Dove than Hawk.
Evidence for Fact 7.2. In case that players can only use the IBA strategy in
the population game, Simulation HD13 shows that IBA players tend to select
Hawk. That IBA players tend to play Dove with even smaller probability if the
probability of being matched with a BR player increases can be seen in Table 1
(HD6).
To explain why IBA players tend to select Hawk, notice that IBA players
select the stage game action which yields the maximal payoff observed in their
neighborhood. Hence, after the first periods, they select Dove only if no player
in their neighborhood has payoffs equal to π (Hawk, Dove). However, because
there are only four different payoff levels, and each player observes the payoffs
of nine players, it is very likely that at least one of these nine players has this
payoff. For example, ignoring any effect due to spatial distribution, if 50 percent
of the players selected Dove last period, then IBA players select Dove with an
average probability of roughly
(
1− 1
2
(
1− 1
2
))9
= 0.075. In fact the equality
(1− pD (1− pD))
9 = pD
has one stable solution: approximately pD = 0, 2. This is even lower than the 31
percent that Simulation HD13 shows in case only the IBA strategy is available,
due to the fact that we ignored the effects of the spatial distribution, which
counts for correlation between the choices of neighbors. Neighbors will tend to
choose the same actions because they base their decision on related data sets.
Figure 3 shows a scatterplot of the share of BR players versus the share of
players that select Top. The data are taken from the initial periods of 5 runs
of Simulation HD6. Of each run the data was stored at the end of period 900k,
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Figure 3: Scatterplot of Share of BR Players versus the Share of Players who
select Dove. Data is generated by runs of Simulation HD6
for every k = 0, 1, 2, ..., 30. The same data on the share of BR players is also
presented in five time series in Figure 5. The Figure shows that the probability
with which a player plays Dove increases if the share of BR players increases,
although both BR players and IBA players are less likely to play Dove.
Evidence for Fact 7.3. This fact is observed in the Simulations HD25 to
HD27. This is intuitive, since, as we observed in the evidence for Fact 7.2, the
probability that the maximal payoff π (Hawk,Dove) is realized by some player in
a neighborhood is quite high. The population is a hundred times larger than a
neighborhood. Thus a player observes the maximal payoffs almost surely under
global interaction.
Evidence for Fact 7.4. The maximal joint payoff in a period is either 2α or
α+2ε. In both cases at least one player has to select Dove. So if the outcomes
are efficient, the population needs to play Dove at least 50 percent of the time.
Clearly this is not the case (Table 1). Note that in the pure Nash equilibria
precisely one of the players plays top, and that in the mixed Nash equilibrium
both players play Dove with 50 percent probability. Hence it is clear that the
dynamics do not converge to any Nash equilibrium.
We now consider which strategy is more likely to obtain which benefit. This
provides some intuition for the results regarding the popularity of the different
strategies.
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Fact 7.5 In the long run, BR players are more likely to obtain the coordi-
nation benefit ε, while IBA players are more likely to receive the selection
benefit α.
Evidence for Fact 7.5. Simulations HD1 to HD12 show that there are more
BR players if the coordination benefit is larger relative to the selection benefit.
Since the long run rule considers only the average payoffs of each strategy for
some neighborhood, it follows that BR players obtain a relatively large share of
their payoffs from the coordination benefit, while IBA players obtain a larger
share of their total payoffs via selection benefits. However, also in absolute
sense BR players are more likely to obtain coordination benefits and less likely
to obtain the selection benefit than IBA players, as is shown by the following,
rough, numerical estimation.
Using data from Simulation HD6, we estimate several probabilities in Table
2. With these probabilities we estimate that the average BR player receives the
coordination benefit with probability4
pBRco = 2 pBB p
H
BB p
D
BB + pBI
(
pHBI p
D
IB + p
D
BI p
H
IB
)
,
and the selection benefit with probability
pBRsel = pBB p
D
BB + pBI p
D
IB .
For the average IBA player these probabilities are
pIBAco = 2 pII p
H
II p
D
II + pIB
(
pHBI p
D
IB + p
D
BI p
H
IB
)
and
pIBAsel = pII p
D
II + pIB p
D
BI .
According to these estimates, the average BR player receives the coordination
benefit with 0.68 probability and the selection benefit with 0.20 probability. The
average IBA player receives the coordination benefit with 0.35 probability and
the selection benefit with 0.33 probability. Thus these simulation results suggest
that BR players are indeed more likely to receive the coordination benefit, while
the IBA players are more likely to receive the selection benefit. According to our
estimates an IBA player selects Hawk in about 93 percent of the cases. Hence in
roughly 93 percent of the cases the maximal payoffs in the neighborhood of an
IBA player are equal to the maximal payoffs in payoff matrix AHD. The same
analysis for HD9 gives us that the coordination benefit and the selection benefit
are obtained by BR players with a probability of 0.69 and 0.19 respectively, and
by IBA player with a probability of 0.39 and 0.38 respectively.
To see the intuition behind Fact 7.5, let us consider how these two strategies
select the action and how they interact. BR players act as if they assume that the
opponents behavior is given, namely the opponent’s last action. They respond
4 The descriptions of the different variables, and how their value is estimated is explained
in Table 2.
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Description Sym
-bol 
Esti-
mate 
HD6 
Esti-
mate 
HD9 
Calculation 
Prob(BR matched with BR) pBB 0.45 0.47 Share BR nghb BR, Tabel 1 
Prob(BR matched with IBA) pBI 0.55 0.53 1 – pBB 
Prob(IBA matched with BR) pIB 0.30 0.37 Share BR nghb IBA, Tabel 1 
Prob(IBA matched with IBA) pII 0.70 0.63 1 – pIB 
Prob(BR player plays Dove) pDB 0.67 0.67 Pr(D|B) , Tabel 1 
Prob(IBA player play Dove) pDI 0.07 0.05 Pr(D|I) , Tabel 1 
Prob(IBA plays Dove vs IBA 
player) 
pDII 0.07 0.05 pDI , because IBA players ignore their opponent, 
we assume that the probability with which an 
IBA player plays Dove does not depend on the 
strategy of his opponent. 
Prob(IBA plays Hawk vs IBA 
player) 
pHII 0.93 0.95 1 – pDII  
Prob(IBA plays Dove vs BR player) pDIB 0.07 0.05 pDI 
Prob(IBA plays Hawk vs BR 
player) 
pHIB 0.93 0.95 1 – pHIB 
Prob(BR plays Dove vs IBA player) pDBI 0.93 0.95 pHIB, BR players adapt to the action of the 
opponent. 
Prob(BR plays Hawk vs IBA 
player) 
pHBI 0.07 0.05 pDIB, BR players adapt to the action of the 
opponent. 
Prob(BR plays Dove vs BR player) pDBB 0.35 0.35 Solution to equation pDB = pBB pDBB + pBI pDBI 
Prob(BR plays Hawk vs BR player) pHBB 0.65 0.65 1 – pDBB 
 
Table 2: Numerical approximation based on Simulations HD6 and HD9.
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optimally to that belief in order to get the coordination benefits. Observe that
because their opponent’s strategy is believed to be predetermined, the strategy
of the BR player cannot influence whether they get the selection benefit or not,
for this depends only on the opponent’s strategy. So the only thing they can
influence is whether there is succesful coordination. In contrast IBA players
imitate the action yielding the maximal payoffs in their neighborhood: often
this is Hawk (see the evidence for Fact 7.2). It is as if they assume that their
opponent will adjust to them, to facilitate this maximal payoff of selection and
coordination benefits. Therefore, when a BR and an IBA player are matched,
then it is often as if the two play a sequential Hawk-Dove game in which the
IBA player moves first and the BR player moves second, which leads to succesful
coordination and to an additional selection benefit for the IBA player. In this,
the adaptiveness of the BR strategy is both its strength and its weakness. It is
more likely to receive the coordination benefit, especially if used against some
predictable opponent (in the sense that he does not often change his action),
but is therefore less likely to obtain the selection benefit if the opponent often
plays Hawk. The strength of the IBA strategy is that it exploits any such
adaptiveness, by his own lack of adaptiveness in often selecting Hawk regardless
of the opponent. Note that if some IBA player receives the maximal payoffs
(and thus plays Hawk), because he observes his own payoff, he will continue to
play Hawk and receive maximal payoffs at least until he meets an IBA player
or until he becomes a BR player. Also note that both BR players and IBA
players are more likely to coordinate than BR players or IBA players among
themselves, because of the predictability of the action choice by IBA players,
and the adaptiveness by BR players.
We now consider some facts regarding the ’equilibrium level’ of the share
of BR players to which the dynamics converge. Fact 7.6 states that there is a
unique level of the share of BR players in the population to which the dynamics
converge, in the sense that the share of BR players approaches and remains
close to that level. This level we call the equilibrium level. Facts 7.7 and 7.8
give some insight into this equilibrium level.
Fact 7.6 The dynamics converge to a unique equilibrium level of the share
of BR players in the population if (i) there are initially at least 100 users
( 1
9
of the population) of each strategy under the IBB rule; or (ii) if both
strategies are available to the players and the long run rule is the BR rule.
Let us consider the share of players that adopt the BR strategy in our model.
In order to talk about the share of BR players, it is good to keep in mind how
strategies are selected by the long run rule. The long run IBBR selects the
strategy for a player which yields the highest average payoff in his neighborhood.
Thus the popularity of a strategy is determined by the likelihood with which
it gives the higher average neighborhood payoffs. So, roughly speaking what
matters are the expected payoffs of a strategy and therefore (in the long run)
the probabilities with which the selection benefit and the coordination benefit
is acquired as well as the relative selection benefit.
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Figure 4: Time Series of three runs with different initial shares of BR players
In contrast the long run BRR selects for a player the strategy that prescribed
the better action to him in his last interaction. The better action is equivalent
with the action that yields the coordination benefit. To be precise: an IBA
(BR) player switches to BR (IBA) if the action prescribed by the IBA (BR)
strategy does not yield the coordination benefit, while the action that the BR
(IBA) strategy would have prescribed would have given this benefit. So roughly
speaking, what matters is the probability with which the coordination benefit
is obtained in this model. Hence we would expect that the strategy which is,
in absolute terms, better in acquiring the coordination benefit is also the more
popular under BRR. Similarly, we expect that the strategy that is, in absolute
terms, better in acquiring the selection benefit is more popular under IBBR
than under BRR, if the relative selection benefit is at least one.
Fact 7.7 Under IBBR, the equilibrium level is weakly decreasing in the rel-
ative selection benefit. Under BRR the relative selection benefit does not
influence the equilibrium level.
Fact 7.8 The BR strategy is more popular than the IBA strategy under
BRR. Under IBBR it depends on the relative selection benefit.
Evidence for Fact 7.6. Table 1 shows that the standard deviation in the
final share of BR players is quite low. Moreover, comparing Simulations HD15
to HD18 with Simulations HD6 and HD10 shows that the initial share of BR
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Figure 5: Time Series of 5 Runs of Simulation HD6.
players does not matter, at least if it is not lower than 1
9
or higher than 8
9
. Figure
4 shows some randomly chosen time series with different starting conditions and
a relative selection benefit α
ε
= 15. Observe that in the long run the share of BR
players fluctuates around the equilibrium level (0.355) of BR players, regardless
of the initial share. Note that the dynamics fluctuate around this equilibrium,
instead of reaching and staying in it (see Figure 5). Simulations HD19 to HD24
show that this is also the case under BRR. Compare especially HD23 and HD24
with HD19.
Under IBBR, a strategy cannot be selected if it is not currently present in
the population. Hence if the share of BR player becomes 1 or 0, then this share
will remain the same for the rest of the simulation. Hence these are, strictly
speaking, equilibria of the dynamics. Nonetheless, even for low initial shares
(of about 1
9
) and relatively high shares (of about 8
9
) the simulations converge to
the reported equilibrium levels. This, and the intuition that we develop below,
suggests that the dynamics tend to go away from these ’extreme equilibria’.
However, due to the randomness in the model, it is possible to end up in one
of the extreme equilibria if the initial share is close enough to it. Therefore
we need the restrictions in part (i) of Fact 7.6. Because under the BR rule a
strategy can still be chosen if it is currently not present in the population, the
dynamics can leave a state in which the share of BR players is 1 or 0. Hence
the restrictions of (i) are not necessary under part (ii) .
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In the following paragraphs we will see why it is intuitive that such a unique
equilibrium level exists. Consider first the model with IBBR. The existence
of a unique equilibrium level to which the dynamics converge, indicates that
for higher (lower) shares of BR players, the share of BR players is expected to
decrease (increase). There are two reasons why this is the case.
First let us suppose that the (positive) probability with which an updating
BR player (IBA player) switches to the IBA (BR) strategy does not depend
on the share of BR players. It follows directly that the expected change in the
share of BR players is negatively related to the share of BR players. The more
BR players there are, the more likely it is that a BR player is allowed to update,
and not an IBA player, and the more likely it is that a player switches from
BR to IBA instead of the other way around. Hence the larger the share of BR
players, the more likely it is to decrease.
Second we argue that the probability with which an updating player selects
the IBA strategy is expected to increase in the share of BR players. Clearly this
reinforces the first reason. A higher share of BR players implies that all players
are more likely to be matched with a BR player. If IBA players are more likely
to meet a BR player, they will receive both the selection and the coordination
benefit with higher probability. For BR players a higher probability to meet
a BR player implies a higher probability of getting the selection benefit, but
a lower probability of getting the coordination benefit. As there is no reason
to expect that the increase in the probability of receiving the selection benefit
is larger for BR players than for IBA players, it is unlikely that the expected
profits of BR players increase more than those of IBA players in response to an
increased share of BR players.
Now consider the model with BRR. The first reason above clearly applies
regardless of the long run rule, hence it applies here. Regarding the second
reason, the strategy selection under BRR depends only on whether the coordi-
nation benefit is obtained, not on its size or the selection benefit. Since, as the
share of BR players increases, BR players become less likely and IBA players
more likely to obtain the coordination benefit, also the second reason applies
here.
Evidence for Fact 7.7. See Simulations HD1 to HD24. Recall that Fact
7.5 stated that, around the equilibrium levels (in the long run), BR players
are more likely to receive the coordination benefit, while IBA players are more
likely to receive the selection benefit. Hence BR players benefit relatively much
from the coordination benefit, and relatively little from the selection benefit.
It is therefore logical that a decrease in the coordination benefit relative to
the selection benefit (so an increase in the relative selection benefit) harms the
average profits of BR players more than those of IBA players. Therefore it is
intuitive that the probability with which the BR strategy in some neighborhood
has the highest average payoffs also increases when the relative selection benefit
decreases. Hence under IBBR the popularity of BR players is inversely related
to the relative selection benefit. Under BRR payoffs as such do not matter. It
matters only whether a best reply is played. Since the preference ordening of
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players over the four possible outcomes does not depend on the relative selection
benefit, a change in the relative selection benefit has no effect on the equilibrium
level under the BR rule.
Evidence for Fact 7.8. Simulations HD19 to HD24 show this fact. Remember
that under BRR it matters only which strategy or strategies prescribed the best
reply in the last interaction. Hence the strategy which is best in obtaining the
coordination benefit, becomes more popular. As we have seen before, see for
instance Fact 7.5, the BR strategy is better at coordinating succesfully. Hence
the BR strategy is more popular under BRR.
In contrast, under IBBR payoffs do matter (see Simulations HD1 to HD18).
Hence the actual payoffs play a role, which is a relative advantage to the IBA
players provided that the relative selection benefit is not too small (look for ex-
ample at Simulation HD12). Note that Simulation HD10 has a relative selection
benefit equal to one, and that the equilibrium level (of the share of BR play-
ers) is lower there than in the simulations with BRR. This provides additional
evidence for Fact 7.5.
To conclude we consider some facts regarding the level of clustering and
the differences between local and global interaction. Clustering is defined as a
distribution of strategies over the players such that randomly selected pairs of
neighboring players are more likely to have the same strategies than randomly
selected pairs of non-neighboring players. So if there is clustering, neighbor-
ing players tend to select the same strategies. If the opposite of clustering,
dispersion, occurs, than neighboring players tend to select different strategies.
Fact 7.9 Under the IBB rule there is clustering. Under the BR rule there
is dispersion.
Fact 7.10 With global interaction the equilibrium level (of the share of BR
players) is (i) under the IBB rule higher than with local interaction; (ii)
under the BR rule lower than with local interaction.
Evidence for Fact 7.9. The last column of Table 1 show whether there is
clustering, that is, whether neighboring players tend to select the same strate-
gies. From Simulations HD1 to HD12 it is apparent that under the IBBR there
is clustering. This is not surprising since IBBR bases the selection of strate-
gies on information from the neighborhood, and neighborhoods of adjacent (so
neighboring) players overlap. So neighboring players base their strategy choice
on correlated data sets. As a consequence there is clustering.
Simulations HD19 to HD22 show that under BRR the opposite of clustering
occurs: dispersion. Neigboring players tend to select different strategies. We
offer two reasons for this. First, the data sets on which neighboring players base
their decision do not overlap, as they do with IBBR. Therefore one important
reason for clustering is removed. Second, the predictability of IBA players makes
it easy for matchings of BR and IBA players to coordinate, whereas BR-BR and
IBA-IBA matchings are generally much less successful in coordination. Hence,
17
under BRR a player in the midst of BR players will more likely change from
BR to IBA than vice versa. Among IBA players, an updating player will likely
select the BR strategy. Dispersion is the result.
Evidence for Fact 7.10. This is apparent from the comparison of Simulations
HD25, HD26 and HD27 with HD6, HD9 and HD21 respectively. To understand
why this is the case, let us first rediscuss the evidence from Fact 7.6. There we
found BR players are more likely to receive the selection benefit, but less likely
to get the coordination benefit as a result of a larger probability of meeting BR
players, while IBA gain both benefits with higher probability. Hence we expect
that BR players benefit more from clustering under IBBR than IBA players.
Moreover note that IBA-IBA matchings are less likely to result in coordination
than BR-BR matchings. Thus also under BRR the IBA players suffer more
from an increase in the clustering than the BR players.
Recognize that there is no clustering or dispersion possible with global inter-
action. Under IBBR this implies a ’decrease’ in the level of clustering, and thus
a relative benefit to the IBA players. Hence we see a lower equilibrium level
with global interaction. Under BRR there is ’more clustering’ with global than
with local interaction. Hence there the equilibrium level is higher with global
interaction.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we study a local interaction model where agents play a symmetric
Hawk-Dove stage game against a randomly selected neighbor. We investigate
by simulation which of two learning rules (BR and IBA) is most likely to be
adopted by the population as their strategy.
In all of the simulations both strategies survived. Therefore it is not unlikely
that agents use different ’learning rule strategies’. Because the dynamics in the
action space never rest, the outcomes are determined by the long run result.
We see that, at the equilibrium levels of BR players, the BR players are more
likely to obtain the coordination benefit and that IBA players are more likely to
get the selection benefit. As a consequence, the popularity of the BR strategy
is decreasing in the relative selection benefit. In terms of actions, IBA players
play Hawk often in local interaction and almost always under global interaction,
because playing Hawk can result in the maximal payoff α+ ε. BR players tend
to play Dove (the dove-like action) unless two BR players meet: then they tend
to play Hawk (the hawkish action), because it pays off to choose a different
action than their opponent.
When the long run rule is BRR instead of IBBR then the payoffs to strategies
are irrelevant, except for the question which strategy prescribed a better reply.
Hence the relative selection benefit is of no influence. The BR strategy is more
popular under this rule than the IBA strategy, since at the IBBR equilibrium
levels the BR strategy is better at coordination. Also, whereas under IBBR
neighboring players tend to have the same strategy (clustering) they tend to
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have different strategies (dispersion) under BRR. This is because the action
choice of BR players fluctuates more than that of IBA players (who almost
always play Hawk). This makes it easier for a BR player to coordinate with an
IBA player than with another BR player. Thus players do better when their
strategy is relatively impopular in their neighborhood. Hence players should
not learn as their neighbors do.
5 Appendix
The first column in Table 1 is an identification number for each simulation.
The second column gives the relative selection benefit, while the third column
provides, when needed, some additional information on the simulation. ”BRR”
is written there if the long run rule is BRR. It says ”GI” if there is global
interaction instead of local interaction, and it says ”BR only” (”IBA only”) if
all players can only use the BR (IBA) strategy. Finally, ”B:I = x:y” is written
if initially players use the BR strategy with probability
x
x+ y
instead of 1
2
.
The fourth column gives the average share of BR players in the population
at the end of the runs, and the fifth column gives the standard deviation of
this number. Columns 6 to 8 gives for all players, BR players and IBA players
respectively, the frequency with which Dove was played on average in the last
9000 periods of each run. The last column provides some statistics regarding the
tendency of neighboring players to have the same strategy. More specifically,
it gives the average share of BR players among the neighbors of BR players.
We say that clustering occurs if BR players have relatively many BR neighbors,
thus if the share reported here is higher than the share of BR players in the
total population.
In Table 1 we also present a few simulations with ε ≥ α > 0. For these
parameters the game is not a HD game anymore. These few simulations indicate
that the conclusions for the HD game also hold for stage games with this range
of parameters.
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